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YUGOSLAV CITIZENS IN FASCIST GERMANY 
SUMMARY 
The number of Yugoslav citizens in Germany was on a constant increase after 
World War I (1925: 14,067; 193'5: 17,258; 19,39: 58,'240). As a result of deportations 
that were a part of the fascist forced labor scheme during World War DI, the number 
grew still further. ]n Germany between 19'3'3 and 1939, Yugoslavia ranked among 
the leading countr,ies of foreigners' origin. i];n relation to the population of the host 
country, the share of Yugoslavs living in the German !Empire grew from 0.12 to 
0.35%. They were concentrated in the Pr·ussian provinces of the Rhein and Westp-
halia. The two held almost a third of all Yugoslav citizens up to 1939. In the big 
cities of the region concerned the number of Yugoslavs dropped in absolute terms 
and, consequently, as a share in the total population, although Yugoslavs represented 
a growing share of the foreign population in the same period of time. 
Connected with its emergence, Lenin considered one of the !Peculiar 
features of imperialism to be »decreasing migration out of imperialist count-
ries and the increasing migration (influx of w:orlkers and immigration) into 
these countries from under-developed ones with 1ow wag·es« {7: 287). This 
»Special ki.nd of mass migration« (6: 447) founded in the capitalist eoonQmy was 
also to be distinctly observed in Germany since the end of the 19th century. 
Within the migration of 1albour forces to imperialistic Germany, Yugoslavs al-
ways had their place. The important study upon this theme by Kolar-Dimitrije-
vic, based on Yugoslav sources, proceeds from the ascertainment that »the first 
larger-scale migration of Yugoslav seasonal workers to Germany was register-
ed as early as in 1921« !(3: '3:H+).1 With this, the members of the Yugoslav 
population in association with the Danube Monarchy, which came to Germany 
already before and during World War I and were hardly statistically survey-
ed, remain unoonsidered. This also holds true of the mQstly Slovenian mine-
-w:Or:ker colonies in the Rhein-Westphalian 1ndustrial area. 
Foreign labour forces in the German Reich were employed on the basis 
of permissions from the German Labour Centre. According to their records, 
which did not include, to be sure, aH incoming workers outside of Prussia, 
fl'om 1924 to 1932 (with the exception of 1925 anrd the decline after 1931 
linked to the world ecQnomic crisis), between 6,50{) and 9,000 workers were 
permitted constantly every year (12). During the time between the two world 
wars the number of Yugoslav citizens in Germany rose significantly and con-
tinuously. 
1 The assertations of this fundamental work which follow are suplemented and made 
precise on further sOUII'cea. 
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Table 
Yugoslav resident population in the German Reich, 1925, 1933 and 1939 
(percentile increase; fraction of total foreign population) 
Increase Total 
Yugoslavs Foreign % Yugoslav 
number % population 
1925 14,067 957,096 1.5 
1933 17,258 3,191 22.7 756,760 2.3 
1939 58,240 40,982 237.5 1,019,895 5.7 
(German 
territory 1937) (32,707) (15,449) 85.5 697,144 (4.7) 
Source: · Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (ptatistics of the German iReich) vol. 401, pp. 
387 + ; vol. 4:51, part 4, p. !Y1; vol. 552, part 5, pp. + 
The increase from 1925 to 1933 was approximately 23 percent smaller 
than the 238 percent from 193'3 to 193'9. With this, however, possible inade-
quate data should be pointed out (v. 3: 332, note 4) and it should be con-
sidered that the data for 1939 included the annexed regions of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia. However, alS<J after al!l:owing for the Yugoslavs living in 
these territories, an increase of almost 90 percent is possible. 
With this Yugoslavia moved upwards in the list of soui"ce countries of 
foreigners in Germany, and also the fraction of the migrating Yugoslavs in 
relation to the homeland populat101I1 trebled, from 0.12 to 0.35 percent (5: app. 
tab. 2, 3). A foundational contract between Yugoslavia and Germany on the 
conditions for the recruitment, :processing and engagement of foreign labOur-
ers was resolved on December 15, 1928 '(10: 9). In connection with the effects 
of the crisis, on January 23, 1933, a »regulation concerning foreign workers« 
(lla: 26+) in Germany was enacted. This established an employment author-
ization for the employer and a worlk :permit for the foreign worker as prer-
equisites for the intake of workers from foreign countries. The work permit 
was issued in two forms: an Arbeitskarte {wol'lk card) with a maximum vali-
dity of 12 months or a Befreiungsschein {exemption P!liPer) on condition of a 
minimal ten-y.ear stay in Germany. As a result of the crisis' effects on the work 
force market with more than six milLon Germans unemployed, the regulation 
presented the high point of a more restricted permissiOII1 policy, but also 
simultaneously offered good possilbilities for the adaptation to oha.nging eco-
nomic conditions and for the permanent su:pervisiOIIl of foreign workers. In 
the framework of the German-Yugoslav Trade Agreement from May 1st, 
1934 (11 b), a free exchange of workers between the two countries was provid-
ed for. 
The years from establishment of the fascist dictatorsh]p in January 1933, 
to about 1936, regarding the employment of foreigners, were characterized by 
a cautious turning away from the restrictive pel"'lriSSsion policy vis-8.-vis 
foreign workers. The progressively mor-e openly forced aggressive armament 
policy gav;e rise to a rapidiy growing demand for work forces. This led to a 
spontaneous domestic migration, and al:S'o, in growing measures, in the frame-
work of the fascist employment policy, to a forced domestic migratiOII1 move-
ment. A gmwing unfulfilled structural, and also more and more general 
domestic, demand for labour forces .developed. Such a deveLopment resulted 
in a new stage in the employment of foreigners from 1936-37 onwards, 
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abo-ve all in connection wirth the so-called second Four Year Plan, a programme 
of forced preparation for war. 'Regarding the recruitment of foreign workers 
which, in the given situation, fell more and .more imperatively into the field 
of view of the fascist employment officials, the fulfilment of the demand 
was also decidedly limited .lby the regime's precarious foreign currency ex-
change situation under war mobilization conditions. The effiiployment of 
Yugoslav labour forces in Germany during the l913Qs falls categorically into 
this domain. 
After a corresponding principle decision was made by the delegate for 
the Four Year Plan, Hermann GOring, the departments concerned began 
working in the beginning of 1937 on the practical r·ealization of the phm. 
In a discussion on February 5th, 1937 ·»Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, 
as well as Austria and Hungary were contemplated as recruiting areas .... 
first of all.« It was also held to be true »that, especially in Po-land, Cz,echo-
slova:kia and Yugoslavia, p!"O'SipectLve recruitments could be executed with 
success.« Aspired agreements should »have been r'eachable with Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Austria, as necessary on the basis of already 
existing migratory worlker settlements with these lands« {PAF-a). The acute 
foreign currency exchange problems were also discussed, and shortly there-
after, newly em,phasiz,ed {16 b). During the further treatment of these prob-
lems it was recorded in a subsequent meeting on March 22nd: »For Yugoslavia, 
where approximately 3,00{) agricultural migratory workers of German origin 
could be recruited, everything .d~pends on whether a way can be found to 
make availalble the foreign currencies for the transfer of savings, which is 
not possible at present« (PAF-c). Investigation resulted in the following: »The 
re1ations in Yugoslavia are particularly difficult in the current time period. 
Reliance on the German~Yugoslav Clearing Agreement for the transference 
of saved w ag·es from 2,000 migratory workers is, with the situation of things, 
not yet possible.« After an illustration of details and analysis it was conclu-
sively recorded that »the disjpatch af a delegation to Belgrade to enable an 
agreement on the transfer of salary savings by means of clearing .. . {aJPpear), 
therefore, at the current point in time without prospects« (PAF~d) . Shortly 
thereafter the Reichsanstalt filr Arb.eitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosrenversicher-
ung (National Office for Labour Mediation and Unemployment Insurance) 
had to· concisely report suibordinately to the Reichsarbeitsminister filr Fragen 
des ArbeitseinSJatzes (National Minister for Questions on Laibour Engagement), 
and then its president reported to its superior ministry in OO'llnection with 
the Four Year Plan ~paratus: »The intake of .agricultural migratory workers 
from Yugoslavia must be given up, rega11ding transfer possibilities and based 
on a proclamati.on from the National .and Prussian Economic Minister<< ·~AF-e). 
An intermediate solution appeared to be searched for in the recruitment of 
long-term wor:kers, as the Reichsstelle filr Devisenbewirtschaftung (National 
Agency for Foreign Currency Exch ange) noted in the end of July 1937, on . 
the recruitment of such long-term active forces »because an agreement on the 
transferal of migratory workers' earnings wit h Yugoslav government agencies 
had not yet materialized.« During the deli'berations between government 
commissions from both sides at the end of September in Dubrovnik t he prob-
lem appeared anew in the daily agenda, and it was again recorded that »to 
date, no acceptable tra nsferance possibilities have been found << '(IBAK-a), but 
agreement h ad been reached, ~that sufficient payments for this purpose a long 
the lines of the German-Yugoslav Clearing Agreement could be afforded« 
(BAK-b). Then, in the end of October, a corresponding piece of information 
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to the chief jpresidents of finances followed to »remit to Yugoslavia on a 
larger scale than before the current wor;kers' earnings and the already existing 
savings of the long-term .a-nd migratory workers<< {,BAK-e). Such possibilities 
found their roots in secret ta·lks in April 1936 in Zagreb, and in July of the 
same year in Berlin, and were made precise and revived in October 1938 and 
June 1939 {BAK-d:200, 236 +). 
At the same time as the ·efforts to make a salary transfer possible, the 
Yugoslav consulate in Diisseldorf turned to the president of the Reichsanstalt 
and, because of sur.plus la'bour forces in Yugoslavia, testified to immens·e in-
terest in the employment of Yugoslav seasonal agricultural workers in Ger-
many, and pleaded for the »most preferrential treatment of this concern 
possible, << last but not least because of the »alw.ays..Jdeveloping closer fri endly 
economic ties<< between both countri·es ·(LPAF-f). 
In the beginning of 1938, after Yug:Oslavs were employed in 1937 {above 
all in the Mecklenburg agricultural areas) (BAK-e) the pmblem acutely con-
fronted the fascist leadership. On January 19th, 1938, Secretary of State 
Friedrich Syrup estimated the demand to be 75,000 migratory workers and 
160,000 long-term workers, of which numbers it was horped 4,000 migratory 
and 1,000 long-term workers could be recruited from Yugoslavia (PAF-g). 
The minut~ :of a top meeting on the Four Year Plan recorded on this: »From 
Yugoslavia ten-twelve thousand agricultural workers could be taken over; 
~date only ·5,000 of these could be insured for.eign currency-wise (in the 
rpast year only 2,000 worikers were taken in from there) << ,(BAK-f). A corres-
ponding agreement was met only concerning these 5,000, far below Yugoslavia's 
supply possibilities and Germany's demand fo r labour forces {3:3·36). Again 
it appeared that a significant fraction of these agricultural workers were 
placed in Mecklen!burg '(ZS + A-a). 
For the year 193•8 there existed a dependable activity report from the 
Reichsanstalt on the »intake of foreign agricultural workers, << 2 which also 
contained statements to Yugoslavia. The figures already mentioned above 
were introductorily quoted, and it was recorded that they s ucceeded »in gaining 
a larger number of workers for ·employment in German agriculture.<< A 
border dispatch office was estaiblished for Yugoslavia in Passau. For questions 
about the transfer of salaries, the ReichS'anstaLt distributed an instruction 
booklet in German, S erbo-Cmatian and ;Slovenian. Efforts to recruit foreig-
ners of German nationality to work as farm-hands for rural firms were 
confronted by difficulties also in the case of those from Yugoslavia, as they 
»often rejected assignment there because of unfavourable working conditions 
and smaller \POSsibilities for earning.<< It was discussed in a partiq.tlar region 
of Yugoslavia that the original output contingent of 4,000 migratory wor.kers 
and 1.000 farm-hands rose to 6,000 and 4,000, respectively, !because o.f impmved 
transfer possLbilities. From these numJbers, 6,202 migratory workers and 2,837 
farm-hands were enlisted. The Dr.ava and Danube Banats were established 
as feeder-regions erwuing the dis cussions. From the German point of view 
the COOIPeration with the Yugoslav employment mediators w as formed without 
problems. Difficulties came .aibout only through t he fact that no t enough 
single, younger workers were available. With consent from the Yugoslav 
Ministry of Social Policy an:d Health, lalbourers of German nationality were 
also recruited outside of the agreed feeder-regions. Opposition to this method 
' AAN-c, especially pages 2+ and 12+ report on the intake of foreign agricultural w orkers 
in 1938, October 1~38. Quotati~ following ooginate from this source. see also: PAF-h. 
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from Yug<Jslav police officials became progressively stronger, >> allegedly be-
cause of the nation's <JWn need for agricultural lalbour f<Jroes, but in reality 
in order to prevent a mass emigration of German nationals.« Slovenjan 
workers were particularly positively judged regarding their performance. 
Acoording to the view of recruiting agents it would be poosible to enlist 
twelve-thirteen thousand agricultural workers from Yugoslavia in 1939. 
Such expectations were also reflected in the German press. The news-
paper Munchener Neueste Nachrichten, for example, rep<Jrted in 193·9 on 13,000 
planned agricultural workers in Germany as QJP!posed to 5,00{) in 1938 (ZStA-b). 
However, conferences on the engagement of Yugoslav agricultural workers 
first t<Jok .place in late February 1939 in Belgrade (ZStA--c).s 
In the modification .of the agreement from December 15th, 1928 two 
agreements were reached, each concerning migratory workers and l<Jngterm 
agricultural workers. Germany's wish for 12,000 workers for 1936 (7,000 mi-
gratory and '5,000 long-term worlkers), was met first of all by the Yugoslav 
side with a promise of 10,000 workers. The transcript of the delilberati:an 
contained resolutions on questions concerning wages and working hours 
(which were regulated according to German provisions), arranged for the admi-
nistration :of passports and welfare, and granted Yugoslav delegates the right 
to »occasi<Jnally look into the state of Yug<Jslav workers through visits to the 
workiplaces.« Because of the given f.ood situation in Germany the duty-free 
import of bacon by Yugoslav workers was allowed. A greater remittance 
possi'bility ooncerning migrato'ry woi"Ikers could be reached. tn order to ensure 
the fitness of the la'bour foroes, further »guidelines for the medical pre-
- examination of Yugoolav agricultural workern« were agreed to on German 
initiative. As a foundation for wor1kers' legal relations, work contracts were 
prepared in which essential :points for all bilateral settlements of the 
Reichanstalt agreed. The long-term wor1kers were given ,equality with the 
German agricultural workers, and with migratory workers the same principle 
was adhered to, however more precisely defined through further remarks. 
With a decree from the National Eoonomic Minister on May 15th, 1939, 
a monthly transference of 40 Rekhsmarks f.or migratory workers a nd 35 
Reichsmarks for long-term workers to a total of 400 and 350 Reichsmarks 
{respectively) was allowed 1(BAK-g). The use of a 10 Reichsmarks allowance of 
tax-free income on departure in the form or£ hard currency was f.omn.ally 
prohibited, however, internally the border custom points were privately 
instructed >>in the export of smaller hard currency sums to a total amount 
Qf RM 3 by YugQslav worlkers {to not) make trouble (BAK-h). This maximum 
limit was then raised in Novemlber to the general nQrmal RM 10 (BAK-i). 
Until early September 193'9 no legal remittance possibilities existed fo r 
commercial workers {ZStA-d). On September 8th, this category -of labour 
forces was granted the same poo:silbilities as the agricultural migrato.ry workers 
(BAK-.k). 
The situation o.f YugQslav workers in Germany is, from the Marxist-
-Leninist point -o.f view, to be seen >>not only as the :situation <Jof their wages, 
but as the totality of the conditions of their eXJI)loited lives at the mercy of 
capital<< (4:1). The :situati•on of the workers, determined by the state and marked 
by the state of production relations through the totality of the political, 
economic, social, legal and spiritualcultural conditions of social life, were 
characterized in view of this 'background through :such elements, among 
• Quotations following also originate from this source. 
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others, as wo~k:i.ng conditions, cultural and educational levels, health conditions, 
nutrition and living relations {v. 1:'285). Loud voices were already t o be heard 
in 1937, which called attentiOI!l to the discrepancy between promises ·(that is, 
formal pledges) and the realities found in Germany. Newspapers quoted reports 
from Yugoslav wo11kers from Germany: »The workers, who took up work in 
Germany with joy, have met with great disappointment. In many cases the 
employers have .not carried through with the agreed conditions. They have 
reduced wages on their own authority, and ·Other conditions contained in the 
contracts have been changed.« Contrary to giv en insurances often separately 
inserted, they had to »work in accord and were so done in t hat they went 
'to their knees.'« Overtime was not paid. »For two months they (ate) nothing 
but potatoes. But the worst they are not allowed to send money home« '(PAF-i) . 
Even after allowing for a certain amount of jDurnalistic e~aggeration the 
picture is bleak. During the time that followed, progress concerning the trans-
fer question and the provision of foodstuffs -as mentioned -was achieved. The 
situation for commevcial workers, however, remained problematic in 1938 
and also in 1939. They were confronted by the danger of »not being allowed 
to send their hard-earned money hCJiffie, which was actual·ly the idea behind 
tra veling abroad« (AHZ-a). 
In August great propaganda was reyorted, »in which best conditions and 
especially high daily wages had been promised. In veality it meant : All these 
workers, including those from other countries, work,(ed) under rather harsh 
conditions according to the difficulty of the worik. The working day often 
amount(ed) to 91/ 2 to ten hours. The weekly salary, deducting expenditures 
for food, health insurance and similar items, amount(ed) to an average of 
20-25 Marlks . Often 200 or more people {had to) sleep in the same room in 
wo rk dorms.« Especially problematic in this connection was that most of 
the Hlegally immigrated wor:kers had no laibour contract, and, therefore, 
»Whatever they '(did), it r(was) not possible to impmve their situation or, worst 
of all, to send their wages home« i(AHZ-b). Such an estimation, however, was 
also faced by other observations. German customs officials suspiciously watched 
the increased export of valuaible tndustrial war es and trade goods by Yugoolav 
labourers and established the cause as being, »these people have earned very 
well here, so they still receive today 50 to 170 tRM weekly in cash ; they are 
very easily satisfied and especially frugal. The Yugoslav commercial workers 
had to-date no 1egal ;possiibility to send money to their reLatives in the home-
land« {BAK~k). 
Next to conc~ete work-, wage- and living oonditions, one must also keep 
in mind a completely fundamental aspect. For the concrete historical situation, 
the existence of a fasc1st dictatomhip in Ge11many cannot be forgotten that 
the most brutal political, economic and spirit ual sulbjugation of t he working 
class and the other labourers accompanied the accelerated preparation for 
war. Moreover, under these conditions ,an intensification of the nationalistic 
and r acist ideology and policy came into play, especially tow ards foreignem. 
~asciion, as a form of exertion of power in imperialism, aimed not only 
for repvession of the workers' movement but also for its destruction. Under 
the conditions of fascism, in face of widely-5!Pread broken up wo~kers' move-
ment organizations and the installation of fascist COffiipulsory organizations, 
a demand for the incol'IPoration of foreign l RJbour forces into such institutions 
could not be thought of. Efforts on the p art of the fascists in power were 
directed, above all, towards the so-called German workers front - a special 
organization for the desorientation, secret surveiHance, t errorization and ideo-
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logic influence of the working class and the Reichsniihrstand- a state-monopo-
listic organization which, as a pseudo--corporate »self~governing agency,« 
served, above all, the political and ideological indoctrination of its members 
and the preparation of the land economy for the war. This did not hinder 
the fact that, according to the essentials of fascist rasism, the traditional 
imperialistic concern was strengthened to use the import of Labour forces to 
bring about a division of the working class. However, the particular capital 
valuation · conditions in fascism, characterized by state terr<Jr and t he sub-
sequent possibilities for an i<ncrease and misappr<J!Priation of overtime, worked 
against this in that foreigners lost their function in the industrial reserve 
army more and more. The concr.ete manifestations and effects of the fascist 
dictatorship reduced to a minimum for this case of imperialistic power play 
the posstble progressive effects of latbour force migration in the f<Jrm of a 
consciousness devel<Jpment through contact with a strong and politically 
experienced workers' m<Jvement from the source-land and through the meeting 
with progressive pmduction methods which were principally called to attention 
by the classic Marxist-Leninist authors. In connection with this the heighte-
ned tendency in the '30s to employ foreign labour forces i111 greater masses 
in non-qualified, manual and physically ha:rld wor:k areas should be considered. 
The illegally-fighting, most politically conscious fraction of the working class 
had to alter the priorities of the anti-fascist fight after 1933. Internatioinal 
fundamental positions of the united fight of German and foreign class-com-
rades were not given up; the issues, under actual fight conditions were mo-
dified. This entire connection certainly explains a great deal why instances 
of unified action between German and foreign w<Jrkers in this time period 
are only seldom to be found in sources. On the other hand it is clear t hat the 
aru>ropriate branches of the fascist repression apparatus followed the engage-
ment of foreigners with great attention and princ1ple mistrust because politi-
cally harmful effects on the long-<JiPpressed and mass-disciplined German 
population were possible through the fad that foreigners, though exposed 
to the economic migration surge, were taken from non-fascist, although often 
authoritarian, countries. With the beginning of the strengthened la:oour force 
import, plans were made »to create transit camps f.o·r the investigation of 
political r elialbility<< (BAK-1) and the National Minister of the Interior arranged 
that the workers coming to Germany in fulfilment of the Four Year Plan« 
(should be) included and further, aC<X>rding to opportunity, checked {to see) 
if they are politically unotbjectiona~ble and suitable for employment in Ger-
many« (PAF-j). Foreigners, for example, had to leave Germany because their 
»political opinions were viewed as dangerous to the state« :(2:83c) and there 
were prominent fears that »the local national comrades t(would be) too· easily 
influenced by the political 'subversion'« should laibour forces 'be taken in from 
non-fascist countries (2:788). 
Attempts by foreign workers to improve their working and living con-
ditions, through strikes and other actions, had direct political relevance for 
the fascist regime. Because partial r esults were produced by the fascists' 
concentrated efforts to oppress and terro·rize the working class in connection 
with their ideological oonuptive .and disorienting attempts, the expression 
o:f opinions by foreigners h ad to be seen as irksome and dangerous. 
Thus, as positive conscious-altering effects under certain assumptions 
thr·ough contact with the homeland working class came into play, this was 
also true for influencing attempts from the ruling class in the receiving coun-
try. Here it must be realized t ha t the fear of th e infiltration of revolutionary 
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thinking from wage-earning immigrants determined not only the regimels 
policy of oppression, but also its manipulation eUorts concerning the foreig-
ners. The efforts to propagandize fascist thinking had indirect and direct 
effects on the foreigners through their German work comrades, who had 
already been longer influenced iby this opinion manipulation and were largely 
convinced. Fascist propaganda could still be supported through the concealed 
effects of the discrepancy in a few material living conditions between Ger-
many, as the country of origin. In many source countries the dangers linked 
to this were correctly recognized and presented relatively early. Even the 
Yugoslav Interior Ministry only want·ed to give permission to work in Ger-
many to such workers »Who were correctly politically and nationally oriented 
and would not be influenced by national-socialist propaganda« (AHZ-c). 
The fundamental concern of the state-monQpolistic imperialistic rule, 
and with this also the fascist dictatorship, was on the one hand to promote 
a frictionless exploitation of capital through the employment of foreigners, 
and on the other hand to not endanger its long-term general safeguarding 
through a ·desta'bilization of interior security. 
The concrete development of the results of Yugoslav labour forces mi-
granting to Germany, based on German statistical records, presents itself 
as follows. 
Table 2 
Yugoslavs in the German Reich, 1933 and 1939 
(According to economic divisions, wage earners and independent tradeless workers; 
change in percentage since 19'33 in parentheses) 
I I! III IV V VI VII 
1933. 490 4,563 941 332 628 6,954 2,480 
193!Jl 16,771 14,777 3,047 1,434· 2,122 38,151 4,326 
+ '(3,323) (224) (224) (332) (238) (449) (74) 
1933 7 65 14 5 9 lOO% 
1939 44 39 8 4 5 lOO% 
I Agriculture, animal breeding, gardening, forestry and hunting, fishing 
11 Industry and craft guilds 
Ill Trade and traffic 
IV Municipal service and private service 
V Household service 
VI Total I-V 
VII Independent tradeless workers 





Source: Statist ik des Deutschen Reiches, vol. 451, part 4, pp. 76+, vol. 552, part 5, 
pp. 64-65; percentages calculated 
Ba.~ed on t he figures of resident population (see Table 1) the number of 
wage earners rose from around 7,000 to more than 38,000. This corresponds 
to an increase of almost 450 percent, compared to an increase of only 74 percent 
of independent tradeless workers. Fr·om a structural aS!pect it was unmista-
kable that the largest increase was to be seen in economic division I (agri-
culture, etc.), whose figure rose from seven to 44 percents from 1933 to 1939. 
Simultaneously the dominance of economic division II (industry and craft 
guilds) was reduced from 65 to 39 percent. 
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Yugoslav labour~ers in Germany with work cards or exemption papers 
Numbered 5,126 in the period from April 1. 1935. to March 31. 1936, 6.208 
between April 1. 1936 and March 3'1. 1937, and 9,633 between April 1 1937 and 
March 31. 1938 (P.A!S-a; ZS +A-e). 
These figures encompass the transformation period in the mass-employ-
ment of foreigners and are related to workers whn were granted work cards 
or exemption papers. The relatively small increase from 1935-36 to 1936-37 
could probably be ex;plained by the more exact inclusion of labour forces on 
hand, (5:270 +) while the distintc increase from 1936-37 to 1937-38 may be 
seen as a result of the measures introduced in Spring 1937. 
Table 3 
Yugoslav Labourers in the German Reich, 1938 
(According to regional employment office districts, German territory 1937; April 1, 
1937-March '3'1, 1938; labourers who possessed work cards or exemption papers) 
Reg. employ. office distr. number female work card exemption paper 
Ostpreuflen 12 5 12 
Schlesien 80 38 17 63 
Brandenburg 806 372 568 238 
Pommern 445 93 424 21 
Nordmark 688 211 561 127 
Niedersachsen 218 73 31 187 
Westfalen 2,109 432 34 2,075 
Rheinland 2,619 695 130 2,489 
Hessen 71 23 14 57 
Mitteldeutschland 941 375 881 60 
Sachsen 239 115 50 189 
Bay ern 742 300 409 333 
Siidwestdeutschland 663 321 502 161 
German Reich 9,633 3,053 3,621 6,012 
of those : 
agricultural workers 3,469 1,241 3,051 417 
industrial workers 5,660 1,565 434 5,226 
clerks 505 247 136 569 
Source: Zentrales Staatsarchiv der DDR (ZIS+A), Potsdam Reichskanzlei, Film 19663 
Here the regional division o.f active Yugoslav workers who possessed work 
permission in 1937-38 is made clear, including information on the general 
agriculture and industry distribution. The regional subdivision corresponds 
to the administrative districts and is therefore not comparable to The general 
governing structure. After this the crucial points o.f the employment of }':ugo-
slav labour forces lay in the administrative districts Westphalia and Rhein-
land, where approximately half of all Yugoslavs were active. The figure for 
women, 38 percent, was under the national average. The ratio of agricultural 
workers (36 percent) to industrial wortkers •(59 percent) deviated from the 
national average (a,pprox. 36 and 41 percent, respectively (5: tab. 17) with the 
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industrial workers greatly. The fraction of clerks was also visibly under the 
national average, with 5 percent, as <JiPposed to the current norm of 14 :percent, 
(5: tab. 22). 
Many of these occurances may be traced back to the concentration in the 
Rhein-Westphalian industrial area. The ratio of work card to exemption paper-
-holders was 38 to 6·2 .percent; those with exemption papers numbered slightly 
more than the national average and exhibited a distinct predominance of 
Yugoslavs already active in Germany for longer periods of time. 
Table 4 
Yugoslav agricultural laboure1·s in the German Reich, 1938 
According to regional employment office districts (German territory 1937) 
of these 
Reg. employ. office distr. migratory farmhands number workers 
Ostpreufien 
Schlesien 94 94 
Brandenburg 934 119 815 
Pommern 2,091 2,091 
Nordmark 3,321 2,006 1,315 
Niedersachsen 1,137 1,137 
Westfalen 
Rheinland 
Hessen 4 4 
Mitteldeutschland 195 193 2 
Sachsen 12 12 
Bayern 245 156 89 
Stidwestdeutschland 518 518 
German Reich 9,039 6,202 2,837 
Source: Archiwum Akt Nowych (AIA!N), Warsaw, MSZ, N2 9703 
An overview exclus ively on Yugoslavia n agricultura l workers supplements 
the previous tabulations . Most of the total figur·e, almost 37 percent of 9039, 
w ere in the Nordmank admi•nistrative district, .and three fQurths w ere em,ployed 
in the areas Qf NQrdmark, Pommerania and Lower Saxony. 
Table 5 
Yugoslav labourers in Ruhr-min ing, 1933, 1935 and 1937 
(October each year; according to number, fraction of total crew and fraction of 
foreigners) 
Year. Number Total crew Foreign workers 
1933 996 0.46 20.28 
1935 1,154 0.48 21.63 
1937 1,829 0.60 21:63 
Source: Z en trales Staatsarchiv der DDR {~S+A), Potsdam, D-AF, A WI, Gltickauf, 
Jan. 22, 1900 
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Very specific information is to be found on mmmg in the Ruhr area. 
Ac{!ording to this the numlber of Yugoslavs employed here rose from 996 in 
193'3 to 1,829 in 1937. 
Table 6 
YugosLav in the German Reich, 1939* 
According to job-division, job-level and sex, 
German territory on iMay 1 7th, 1939 including the annexed areas in Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, excluding Memel territory. 
I m . II m. III m. IV .. 
independents 605 465 5f>5 451 582 .· 468 110 
w /helping family .383 357 43 18 120 22 49 
clerks 27 24 286 263 1,197 566 80 
workers 14,722 8,995 12,745 11,618 48 ~1 '1.87 
total 16,737 9,841 13,629 12,350 1,947 1,077 1,325 
independents 3.6 4.1 30.0 
w/helping family 8.2 0.3 6.1 
clerk'S 0.2 2.1 61.4 
workers 88.0 93.5 2.5 
total 100 100 100 
workers 45.7 3S.6 0.1 
total 43.9 35.7 5.1 
V m. VI m. VII m. 
independents 155 108 8 3 3 
w/helping family 17 1 
clerks 693 256 8 1 41 36 
workers 168 99 1,959 17 
total 1,033 464 1,967 18 
independents 15.0 
w/helping family 1.6 
cler~s 67.1 0.4 
workers 16.3 99.6 
total 100 100 
workers 0.5 6.1 
total 2.7 5.2 
.I agricultural, forestry and fishing occupations 
II industrial and craft guild occupations 
III merchant occupations 









V insurance, legal care, education and health care occupations 
VI domestic servants 
VII storage, transport and sanitation service occupations 


































Source: Stati stik des Deutschen Reiches, vol. 552, part 5, p . 82; percentages calculated 
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For 1939 assertions on the structure, based on classification, can be further 
specified into job-divisions and job-levels. When one considers the 38,151 
wage earners under the exclusion of tradeless intependents, the prominent 
fraction of workers i(85 percent) comes particularly to light; in the case of 
agricultural trades the share of workers was 88 percent, and with industrial 
and craft guild trades even higher 1(93,5 prooent). These two tmde divisions 
made up almost 80 percent of the total figure of wage earners, thus over 85 
percent of Yugoslavs were employed 1n these areas (agriculture 45.7 percent, 
industry and craft guilds 3·9,6 .percent). The fraction of men exhibited a signifi-
cant numerical difference of 30 percent in these two groups-agriculture, 61 
percent and industry and craft guilds, 91 .percent. This is eXiplaillled by the 
greater employability of women in agriculture. 
Table 7 
Yugoslav in the German Reich, 1939 
According to age-group, sex and marital status 
age group number male 
under six 3,345 1,698 
7---'10 2,415 1,222 
ll--114 2,697 1,360 
15_;16 1;7:32 858 
17-18 2,:679 1,399 
19-20 '3,322 1,639 
21 885 397 
22--125 131854 2,1'58 
26-30 8,.386 5,494 
31~.35 6,7'42 4,300 
36-40 5,546 3,488 
4i1-45 4,17i5 2,365 
46-50 '3,001 1;554 
51-55 Q,626 1,264 
56-60 2,143 956 
61~65 11,782 804 
over 65 years 2,902 1,293 
total 58,'240 32,269 
single 33,002 18,826 
Source: Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, vol. 552, part 
5, p. 57) 
The age structure of the resident PO\PUlation in 1939 offers additional 
information on the wage-earning activites of Yugoslavs, 57 percent belonged 
to the especially capable age-group from 19 to 45. 
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Table 8 
Yugoslav in the German Reich, 1939 
German territory on May 117th, 19'3·9 including the annexed regions in Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, excluding .Memel territory 
region, district number male female 
Preuj3en 21,701 11,781 9,920 
Ostpreullen 71 52 19 
Stadt Berlin 817 411 406 
Brandenburg 1,002 567 435 
Pommern 2,290 1,244 1,046 
Grenzmark Posen-Westpr. 320 206 1:14 
Schlesien 559 365 194 
Sachsen 658 47'.5 383 
Schlewig-Holstein 1,176 846 330 
Hannover 1,086 559 526 
Westfalen 6,186 3,274 2,912 
Hessen-Nassau 210 liB 92 
Rheinprovinz 7,409 3,838 3,571 
Hohenzoller. Lande 38 32 6 
Bay ern 4,309 3,45~8 851 
Sachsen 935 520 415 
Wilrttemberg 2,241 1,59>7 644 
Bad en 558 313 245 
Thilringen 225 161 64 
Hessen 81 5'1 30 
Hamburg 235 1'26 109 
Mecklenburg 1,693 935 758 
Oldenburg 63 33 30 
Braunschweig 375 167 2~18 
Bremen 49 25 24 
Anhalt 4!3 22 21 
Lippe 33 17 16 
Schaumburg-Lippe 3 2 1 
Saarland •109 (32.707) 57 52 
~•••·-••--••-•••••••••••••••••••••••••••OO•••••••••••••• • • ••••••••••••••oo ••••••••••••••••••••• •-•••·•-•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••oooo.oo•••• ••• •••••••••••••••••• •"'''''''''''''''"""''""''''"""''-••••••••••••••••••••••••••oo••••"•R 
Reichsgau W.ien 3,367 1,314 2,053 
Niederdonau 1,343 666 677 
Oberdonau 396 226 170 
Steiermark 14,524 7,647 6,877 
Karnten 4,457 2,4'25 2,032 
Salzburg 277 13·3 ,, 144 
Tirol-Vorarlberg 44l1 208 233 
Sudetenland 7128 (2'5.533) 395 387 
German Reich 58,.240 32,269 25,97:1 
Source: Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, vol. ~52, par t 5, pp. 9+ 
25,533 people, almost 44 percent of the total number of Yugoslav citizens 
in 1939, resided in the then-existing Re.ichsgauen in Austria and Czechoslovakia. 
Of these, 57 percent alone lived in Steiermark. Among the Reich's regions, the 
Rhein province and Westphalia were the fullest. Almost 42 percent ,of all 
so-called »Old Reich« Yugoslav residents lived there in 1939. Bavaria, P omme-
rania and Wurtternberg followed in the lis t of sojourn areas. The ratio of 
men to women was 515:45. 
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Table 9 
Yugoslav in large cities tn the German Reich, 1939 
German territory on May 17th, 1939 including the annexed areas in Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, excluding Memel territory 
fraction of 
city population foreigners fraction Yugoslavs Yugoslavs to foreig-
ners, 
Berlin 4,338,756 62,240 1.43 817 1.3 
Bochum 305,485 1,870 0.61 227 12.1 
Dortmund 542,261 3,673 0.67 756 20.6 
Diisseldorf 541,410 8,089 1.49 228 2.8 
Duisburg 434,646 12,017 2.76 ·1,973 [6.4 
Essen 666,743 5,908 0.18 917 15.5 
Gelsenkirchen 317,568 3,058 0.96 550 17.9 
Hamburg 1,711,877 16,571 0.97 235 1.4 
Munch en 829,318 9,443 1.14 1,405 14.9 
Oberhausen 191,842 3,337 1.74 629 20.7 
Stuttgart 458,426 3,556 0.78 237 6.7 
Graz 207,747 7,246 3.49 3,669 50.6 
Wien 1,929,976 64,782 3.36 3,367 5.2 
Source: Statisti k des Deutschen Reiches, vol. 5'52, part 5, pp. 36+ 
One peculiarity is the high concentration of Yugoslavs in certain large 
cities. Quantitatively Duisburg and Munich contained the most. Of greater 
interest, howev·er, is the fact that Yugoslavs constituted extremely high shares 
of the foreign :PO!PUlation in the following order: Oberhausen, Dortmund, 
Gelsenkirchen, Duisburg, Essen, Munich and Bochum. With the exception 
of Munich, these cities are all located in the Rhein-Westphalian industrial 
area. 
The established {that is, calculated) statistics call for a report on the whole 
scqpe of the employment of Yugoslavs in Germany in the 1930s. The figures 
from the Reichsanstalt differed obviously according to seasonally active or 
Yugoslav labour forces in Germany for longer periods of time. In the popu-
lation and trade census of 19313 and 1939 all existing persons were included, 
without considering such swbdivisions. Under this aspect the figures in table 
4 are significant in that, especially in .agriculture, a high fraction of work card 
holders (newly taken-in labour forces) were shown, while the opposite is 
indicated for industrial workers, where the long.er-term residents with exem-
ption papers prevail. This trend is emphasized :by the values given for agricultu-
ral workers in table 3, where a further significant increase is recognizable. This 
tendency is further emphasized by the 1939 census, as the num:ber of compa-
rable agricultural workers rose significantly more. The differences between 
the figures from the census and data frOilll the Reichsanstalt are, acooroin.g 
to the aformentioned perceptions, ;probaibly due to the greater dependability 
of the census data opposed to the survey by employment officials which first 
became more reliable during the '30s. Sources also attrilbute this increase to 
illegal recruitment. In May 19139 the National Labour Ministry turned to its 
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conversation partner in the Ministry for Social Policy, Fedor Aranicki, and 
mentioned a series of cases in which »officials of German firms undertook 
efforts in Yugoslavia for the recruitment of ~dustrial workers,« and >>Yugoslav 
workers attempted to find their own ways into the Reich<< {AHZ-d, e). Often-
-articulated indications of illegal entrance determine that the figures :presented 
are minimum values in each case<< {v. 5:7.2t, 291t). The assumption of a n even 
higher number of Yugoslav labour forces is also probable. Exampl·es linked 
to this are: The ,populati·on census in 1939 reported the number of Yugoslav 
residents in German territory to be ·58,240, o.f which 4,309 were in Bavaria; 
in a Yugoslav report on the Ban Administration in Zagreb it was recorded 
that »a large concentration of our wo11kers in Munich, Sal~burg and surro-
unding areas ... is estimated at 10,000-15,0(}0 << (AHZ-f); a German source 
reported: »since February 1939 a g·reat number of Yugoslav workers have co-
me to Germany illegally {without going through the employment office) .. . 
In the Munich-Uprper Bavaria Gau alone 70,000, and in German territory 
altogether 200,000 were reported to have been active<< I{BAK-M). Even conside-
ring a critical evaluation of such data and estimations, they corroborate the 
acceptance of a significantly higher number of Yugoslav labour forces in 
Germany than that which is found in statistics. In spite of this limitation, 
these statistics are good starting points fo·r elarboratioon on trends and for 
structural assertations. In summary it must be re-emphasized that the already 
historical migration of labour forces from Yugoslavia to Germany followed 
the restrictive measures caused by the crisis in the early '30s and then rapidly 
increased through the gmwing demand for wol1kers connected with the inten-
sive preparation for war after 193·7. Linked to the economic migration force, 
due to economic and social conditions in the homeland, this also led 10,000 
Yugoslavs int·o fascist Germany until 193·9. 
The situation of Yugoslav people in Germany, mostly wage earners, was 
determined by the effects of a fascist dictatorship. The traditional restrictions 
in the area of working and living conditions weve more promiment under 
these circumstances. The economic migration force worked in such a way, 
however, that the peQPle going to Germany saw no other possibility than 
to take on this oppression. 
Objectively, the eX!Ploitation of Yugoslav labourers also contributed to 
the preparation of the fascist Ger:man economy for World War IT. 
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JUGOSLA,V1ENlSKII GRM>AiNii U FAšiiS~ICKIO>T NJEMAČIWJ 
SM~ETAK 
Broj jugoslavenskih građana u Njemačkoj bio je u neprestanom porastu od pr-
voga svjetskog rata (14.067 godine 1925; 17.25:8 godine i1o93'5; 58.240 godine 1939.). Kao 
rezultat deportacija koje su bile dio fašističkog programa prisilnog rada za vrijeme 
drugoga svjetskog rata, taj je broj još više porastao. Između 1933. i 19139. Jugosla-
vija bijaše jedna od vodećih zemalja po broju stranaca u Njemačkoj. U odnosu na 
populaciju zemlje domaćina udio Jugoslavena koji su živjeli u bivšem Njemačkom 
Reichu porastao je od 0,12 do 0,351lfo. Oni su bili koncentrirani u pruskim pokraji-
nama Westfaliji i Rajni, u kojima se do ;1939. nalazila gotovo trećina svih jugosla-
venskih građana. U velikim gradovima te regije broj .Jugoslavena opao je u apso-
lutnom smislu, pa stoga i kao udio ukupnog stanovništva, iako su Jugoslaveni u istom 
razdoblju predstavljali udio inozemne populacije u porastu. 
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